The responsibility to protect in Viet Nam: Challenges, opportunities and cases for implementation by Cotton, Joanne & Pohlman, Annie
  
Footer 
  
 
 
 
The Responsibility to Protect in  
Viet Nam: Challenges, Opportunities 
and Cases for Implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper on Viet Nam 
The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast Asia Program 
 
 
 
 
Joanne Cotton     Annie Pohlman 
Joanne.cotton@uqconnect.edu.au   a.pohlman@uq.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
28 May 2011 
The Responsibility to Protect in Viet Nam: Challenges, Opportunities and Cases for Implementation 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2011 
 
Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 
Building 91, 54 Walcott Street 
University of Queensland 
St Lucia QLD 4072 
Australia 
 
Tel: +61 07 3346 6443 
Fax: +61 07 3346 6445 
 
Email: info@r2pasiapacific.org 
The Responsibility to Protect in Viet Nam: Challenges, Opportunities and Cases for Implementation 
 
3 
 
Contents
 
      
Executive Summary         4
    
Section One: Viet Nam and the Responsibility to Protect                                            6 
A Better Future ‘for the People’: Renovation 
The Responsibility to Protect and Viet Nam:     7 
       Viet Nam and Pillar One      9 
     Viet Nam and Pillar Two      11 
   Viet Nam and Pillar Three      13 
     
Section Two: Challenges Viet Nam Faces in Implementing                                              
The Responsibility to Protect       15 
Monitoring the Protection of Civilians in Viet Nam:    15 
  Human Rights in Viet Nam      17 
  Viet Nam’s Policies for Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous People 19 
      Areas of Grave Concern      21 
Minorities in Viet Nam: A History of Discrimination, Repression,              
Religious Persecution, Arbitrary Arrest and Torture   22 
               Case Study: Degar Montagnard Peoples    22 
Case Study: Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples   26 
Redressing Repression and Economic Disparity for Minorities 27 
 
Representation of the People and Civil Society in Viet Nam   28 
 
Maintaining Political Legitimacy      30 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations       34 
 
Author Note and References          38 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Responsibility to Protect in Viet Nam: Challenges, Opportunities and Cases for Implementation 
 
4 
 
 Executive Summary 
 
 
This report examines the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Viet Nam by evaluating 
some of the successes and challenges the country has faced for implementing the 
R2P mandate. Viet Nam’s history of violence, war, social upheaval and economic 
hardship make the prevention of future mass atrocities critical for the country itself 
and for the region. The aim of this report is to present a background of relevant 
issues that have restrained the country’s capacity to implement the R2P and to offer 
recommendations for principle implementations and capacity improvement. The 
report provides specific insight into the weaknesses of Viet Nam’s human rights 
status, the vulnerabilities of ethnic minorities to human rights abuses and the 
potential for these abuses to escalate into the commission of mass atrocities.  The 
overall purpose of this report is to provide useful information for professionals and 
practitioners with an interest in Viet Nam who may be unfamiliar with the country’s 
current political developments and human rights status that are relevant to the 
implementation of the R2P. 
 
This report begins with a short summary of Viet Nam’s turbulent modern history and 
how this has led to efforts by the Vietnamese authorities to improve the country’s 
socioeconomic development and foreign affairs through the implementation of Doi 
Moi renovations. Section one briefly discusses the concept of R2P adopted at the 
2005 World Summit and the commitment of States outlined in the World Summit 
Outcome Document.1 Viet Nam and the Responsibility to Protect is addressed by 
discussing Viet Nam’s political agenda and commitment with regard to each of the 
three pillars in the three-pillar strategy expanded in the UN Secretary General’s 
report on ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’.2 
 
Section two discusses some of the challenges Viet Nam currently faces in its efforts 
to implement the R2P.  The report examines specific concerns regarding the 
Vietnamese legal system and mechanisms that contribute to the government’s 
impunity for the commission of human rights abuses and corruption that could 
subsequently contribute to collective violations of human rights. This section then 
examines Viet Nam’s performance of governance through its capacity to uphold the 
protection of its civilians, in which specific reference is made to human rights abuses 
experienced by ethnic minority groups (Christian Montagnards and Khmer 
Kampuchea Krom Peoples).  Acknowledgement is made of the active efforts that the 
Vietnamese government has made to address the needs and rights of its minorities, 
but in agreement with the response of the United Nations OHCHR to Viet Nam’s 
most recent Universal Periodic Review and the UN Independent Expert on Minority 
Issues, Ms Gay McDougall, this report raises concerns for the well-being of minority 
groups in Viet Nam. The representation of the people and civil society in Viet Nam 
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and also how the Vietnamese Communist Party addresses challenges to its political 
legitimacy are then discussed to demonstrate how patterns of authoritarian political 
thinking and heavy-handed rule used to maintain political power have 
overshadowed improving the country’s capacity to implement the responsibility to 
protect its population.  
 
The overall conclusion of this report is that the population of Viet Nam would 
ultimately benefit from the strengthening of the R2P principle in Viet Nam. 
Undoubtedly, the country’s efforts to develop economically and open its doors to 
the rest of the world have advanced the well-being of its population. In spite of this 
and in order for the Vietnamese government to live up to its commitment to the 
Responsibility to Protect, it is essential for its authorities to implement international 
human rights standards domestically as outlined by the United Nations OHCHR and 
maintain a growing and cooperative involvement in international relations. It is also 
important for the Vietnamese authorities to implement mechanisms that guarantee 
legitimate equity and social justice through the rule of law and socio-economic 
development. The report offers recommendations on how to achieve this. 
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Section One: Viet Nam and the Responsibility to Protect
 
 
A Better Future for the Vietnamese People: Renovation 
At many points in modern Vietnamese history, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam has 
demonstrated concerted efforts to advance the wellbeing of its people as articulated 
by Ho Chi Minh, the country’s revolutionary leader. The country’s constitutional 
pledge is, “a State of the people, by the people, for the people” (cua dan, do dan, vi 
dan)3.  These efforts have been immutably tied to a desire to rebuild after decades 
of human atrocities associated with a history of colonisation, wars and arduous 
revolutionary struggle.  
 
From the Indochina War (French War) against the French from 1945 to 1954 and the 
Vietnam War (American War) during the 1960s and early 1970s, the country’s 
people have faced numerous challenges to reunify and survive. After reunification of 
the north and south in 1976, the country was left desperately poor with a million 
people made homeless and as many as one-eighth of the population injured.4 After 
the war, the United States froze $150 million Vietnamese assets in the United States 
and imposed a trade embargo on Viet Nam (and Cambodia) which ruled out normal 
business transactions between any American companies and Viet Nam. Not only did 
the embargo eliminate Viet Nam’s hopes for an American contribution to postwar 
reconstruction and concession, it also aimed to hinder the recovery of Viet Nam’s 
postwar economy.5 To rebuild the country, the Vietnamese government embarked 
upon the socialization of industry and agriculture, modeled on the constitutions of 
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, and which sadly involved the 
brutal repression of those who protested.6 Hundreds of thousands of people, many 
ethnic Chinese, fled the country either over the mountains to China or as “boat 
people”, heading for China, Hong Kong or overseas as refugees.7  
 
Aside from domestic instability, border clashes with Cambodia led to Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia in 1978 (Cambodian–Vietnamese War) which resulted in the 
fall of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot, but also led to China, in support of Cambodia, 
launching a brief invasion of Viet Nam in 1979.8 From 1979 to 1989, Viet Nam 
occupied Cambodia in an effort to control the country. Eventually, Viet Nam’s 
inability to eliminate Cambodian resistance groups combined with a decline in Soviet 
economic aid led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.9  This 
signaled the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, and encouraged hope that the 
exhausted Vietnamese economy might be reinvigorated. A change in thinking among 
the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the reinstatement to the 
politburo of Nguyen Van Linh, an avid supporter of greater liberalization of the 
economy, coincided with the rise of power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 as general 
secretary of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union.10 The VCP were interested in 
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regenerating their stagnant economy along the lines of Gorbachev’s policies of 
‘Glasnost’ (openness) and ‘Perestroika’ (restructuring), but with a Vietnamese 
distinctiveness.11 
 
Since 1986, Viet Nam has embraced a new policy direction or ‘renovation’ process, 
known as ‘Doi Moi’, which was implemented to promote the country’s 
socioeconomic development and integration with the rest of the world.12 Renovation 
brought about three great changes to the country’s traditional planned economy 
and political and economic isolation. Primarily, authorities made a shift from a 
bureaucratic centralized planned economy to a multi-sector economy that operated 
as an open-market but with state management and a socialist orientation.13 
Renovation also included democratizing social life and building a legal state centred 
on the needs of the people of Viet Nam. Authorities also implemented an open door 
policy with the international community and has now established diplomatic 
relations with 172 nations and signed trade agreements with 76 countries.14 The 
liberalization of the country’s domestic markets has resulted in the rapid growth of 
agricultural and manufacturing production. The new market policy has also opened 
its economy to trade and foreign investment, and has welcomed flows of tourists, 
businesspersons, students, and scholars.15 The UN Millennium Development Goal 
Monitor as of 2008 showed that Viet Nam had already met the target of halving 
extreme poverty and hunger with only 2.2 per cent of the population now living 
below the purchasing power parity (PPP) of $1 per day.16 Viet Nam is also on track to 
achieve five of the eight Millennium Development Goals to be reached by 2015.17  As 
a result, Viet Nam has recovered substantially from its troubled past while Doi Moi 
has produced strong economic growth and noticeable improvements to the 
alleviation of poverty and the improvement of the human well-being of its 
population.  
 
While the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has permitted a growing mid-level 
private sector and has undertaken fundamental institutional changes to improve its 
economy, it continues to hold a firm grip on power and has rejected domestic and 
international requests for political reform and pluralism.18 There continues to be 
concerns regarding particular human rights issues and high levels of corruption that 
have impeded the pace of social and political reform in comparison to the economic 
progress achieved since the implantation of Doi Moi.19 These failures undermine the 
country’s ability to fulfil its Responsibility to Protect (R2P) its civilians. 
 
The Responsibility to Protect and Viet Nam 
The international community has recognized the urgency to prevent the kinds of 
atrocity crimes experienced in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. On the 
recommendation of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and vocal advocacy 
from several countries, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect was adopted in 
the 2005 World Summit and the commitment of States outlined in the World 
Summit Outcome Document in paragraphs 138, 139 and 140 as follows. 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capacity. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out.  
 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide.20 
 
In a follow-up to the World Summit Outcome, a three-pillar strategy to implement 
the Responsibility to Protect was outlined in the Report of the current UN Secretary-
General, Ban Ki-moon, at the 63rd Session of the General Assembly on 12 January 
2009. A summary of the three pillars is as follows: 
 
Pillar one: It is the responsibility of the State to protect its population, 
whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement. From the pre-
existing obligation of State sovereignty, the responsibility lies first and 
foremost with the State. 
 
Pillar two: It is the responsibility of the international community to assist 
States in meeting their obligations to protect by forging a policy, 
procedure and practice that can apply preventive and capacity-building 
measures. 
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Pillar three: It is the responsibility of Member States to respond 
collectively and in a timely and decisive manner when a State fails or is 
unable to protect. This may involve a broad range of measures under 
Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement Disputes), Chapter VII (Action with Respect 
to Threats to the Peace, Breeches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression), or 
Chapter VIII (regional Arrangements) of the UN Charter.21 
 
Viet Nam and Pillar One 
Part of the R2P principle depends upon the ability and determination of Member 
States to fulfill their responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes 
through preventive measures as a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in 
the twenty-first century.22 Viet Nam has committed itself to fulfill this obligation.23 
Vietnamese authorities recognize the significance of Viet Nam’s support of the 
Responsibility to Protect as the country becomes a growing economic and diplomatic 
force in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific 
region. Today, Viet Nam recognizes the success of implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect norm is contingent on its reception and the degree of acceptance 
amongst the actors involved and commits to proactively and constructively working 
with members of the region and international community to ensure its success.24 
Viet Nam endorsed at the UN General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to 
Protect on 24 July 2009, that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect 
its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and from their incitement”.25 This is in 
agreement with paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and 
Pillar One of the 2009 Secretary-General’s Report, ‘Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect’.26  
 
It has been stressed by the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon that R2P is grounded in 
the UN Charter, existing human rights’ treaties and international humanitarian law.27 
Specific measures to prevent mass atrocities such as the ratification of human rights 
treaties, the adoption of accountability measures, the strengthening of the United 
Nations and regional organizations in their early warning mechanisms, stand-by 
abilities and mediation capacities are all important tools for each UN Member 
State.28 In accordance with pillar one, Viet Nam has and continues to progress as an 
active member in the international community and continues to improve domestic 
affairs in areas that demonstrate good-governance, and cooperation with the United 
Nations.   
 
Viet Nam has joined many of the international conventions on human rights 
including specific treaties that are core to the Responsibility to Protect. For example, 
in the early 1980s, Viet Nam became party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
and also the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Viet Nam 
also ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.  
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In addition to signing up to numerous international treaties, Viet Nam has also 
improved the protection of human rights domestically. In accordance with the 
standards of international human rights as stipulated in the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1992 Vietnamese Constitution states that the civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights of every citizen must be respected and stipulates 
that the Vietnamese Constitution and the country’s domestic laws must be in 
conformity with international treaties.29 Since the implementation of Doi Moi in 
1986, Viet Nam has issued and amended approximately 13,000 laws and by-law 
documents, by which civil and political rights have been established more specifically 
and comprehensively.30 In doing so, Viet Nam has demonstrated efforts to protect its 
civilians through domestic mechanisms manifested through the rule of law in 
accordance with international human rights’ standards. However, Viet Nam has been 
encouraged by the United Nations and ASEAN Members to reassess its efforts and 
strategies to establish an independent National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 
so as to improve its human rights performance. Viet Nam’s collaboration within the 
UN and AICHR has offered the Vietnamese authorities the opportunity to engage in a 
commitment to work with other states to address related issues raised by the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and other non-governmental 
organisations. In particular, this collaboration offers Viet Nam the opportunity to 
address the country’s prevailing challenges pertaining to accountability and 
transparency on human rights issues and to provide necessary support to prevent 
and redress many past and current abuses. Areas of concern are in relation to the 
harmonisation and implementation of laws regarding non-discrimination 
(particularly relating to the non-discrimination against indigenous peoples), equal 
participation, the right to freedom of expression, opinion and the press, the right to 
freedom of religion and belief, the rights of women, labour rights and the rights 
concerning detention conditions, ill-treatment of prisoners and the death penalty.31  
The United States Congress has provided assistance and capacity-building towards 
Viet Nam’s human rights’ maintenance and performance as a result of these 
concerns. 
 
In light of these issues, Viet Nam has been working with other States on 
improvements in these areas. The United States Congress, for example, has provided 
assistance and capacity building towards Viet Nam’s human rights’ maintenance and 
performance as a result of these concerns. Viet Nam also engages biannually in 
human rights dialogue with the United States. The Vietnam Human Rights Act of 
2009 was introduced to the US Congress with the purpose of promoting freedom 
and democracy in Viet Nam by the American government by withholding non-
humanitarian assistance until basic civil rights are restored.32 This assistance comes 
as a welcome change in the economic relationship between the two countries, which 
has developed substantially since the end of the US trade embargo with Viet Nam in 
1994. The United States Congress agreed to Viet Nam becoming an official member 
of the World Trade Organization in 2006, amidst assurances that the government of 
Viet Nam would steadily improve its human rights record. The United States 
Congress, however, has found that Viet Nam’s transition toward greater economic 
freedom and trade has not been matched by greater political freedom and 
substantial improvements in basic human rights for Vietnamese citizens.  The 
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Vietnam Human Rights Act, therefore, was partly intended by the US to encourage 
Viet Nam to improve its human rights record.33 The United States has put in place a 
prohibition on increased non-humanitarian assistance to the government of Viet 
Nam unless assistance supports the creation and facilitation of human rights 
training, civil society capacity building, non-commercial rule of law programming, 
and exchange programs between the Vietnamese National Assembly and the United 
States Congress. The Government of Viet Nam must respond by making substantial 
progress towards upholding all human rights to international standards and 
especially the rights which have drawn concern. 
 
As a state party to major international human rights instruments, Viet Nam has 
binding obligations to incorporate human rights’ guarantees into its legal system, to 
comply with the Universal Periodic Review outcome requirements, and to extend 
invitations to UN Special Rapporteurs.  While Viet Nam has voiced its commitment to 
human rights, its performance is restricted by its broadly-defined provisions in the 
country’s Criminal Code which is controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party 
whose political monopoly is enshrined in the Constitution. The provision of the 
Criminal Code and the Constitution restricts the exercise of basic human rights, 
because it excludes all forms of pluralism or alternative thought outside those 
advocated by the Vietnamese Communist Party.34  The country’s capacity to protect 
its civilians against mass atrocity crimes is therefore also restricted.  However, Viet 
Nam’s participation in the UN and ASEAN is encouraging to the country’s continual 
social and political progress and demonstrate the aim to improve human rights 
standards. Until that happens, Viet Nam’s domestic laws and practices are in 
contradiction to its commitment and obligations to international human rights 
standards. 
 
Viet Nam and Pillar Two 
Viet Nam has gained support from and has offered assistance for capacity building 
for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes within the international community. Viet 
Nam has shown this commitment to R2P’s second pillar by working with the UN and 
within regional organizations, such as ASEAN, as well as with their Member States to 
create overarching human rights institutions and mechanisms to prevent and resolve 
conflict. H.E. Ambassador Bui The Giang, Deputy Permanent Representative of Viet 
Nam, endorsed a commitment to work with the international community and the 
United Nations system to obtain assistance and to assist countries to implement the 
R2P in accordance with pillar two outlined in the mandate for ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’. 35 As it stands, Viet Nam is willing to encourage, help and 
assist States to meet their responsibility to protect.36  
 
In 2008-2009, Viet Nam was a non-permanent Member on the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) where it stated that it aspired to promote multilateralism 
and dialogue among the international community so as to create a more sustainable 
foundation for common peace, international security, justice and development. 
During its month acting as president of the Council in July 2008, Viet Nam also took 
the opportunity while holding the presidency to affirm the central role of the UNSC 
in global governance and stated that it hoped to enhance international cooperation 
The Responsibility to Protect in Viet Nam: Challenges, Opportunities and Cases for Implementation 
 
12 
and the strengthening of the Security Council’s role in conflict prevention, while 
reaffirming the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force to resolve civil 
and international disputes.37  
 
Viet Nam displayed its willingness to uphold and provide leadership on these issues 
on numerous occasions during its time on the Security Council.  For example, Viet 
Nam led the Delegation at the Security Council briefing on Somalia on 8 October 
2009.38 At the Delegation, Viet Nam supported an initiative to establish a 
Commission for Security and Pacification tasked to reform Somalia’s security forces 
and law enforcement agencies and also supported the implementation of the 
Djibouti Agreement as a means of conflict resolution in war-torn Somalia.39 
Ultimately, Viet Nam called for close cooperation and effective partnership between 
the UN, the international community, the African Union (AU) and the League of Arab 
States to assist in repelling the onslaught of extremist forces intent on destroying a 
peace process in Somalia that threatened the protection of countless civilians.40 
 
On 15 October 2009, Viet Nam also supported the critical role of the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to facilitate cooperation between 
Belgrade and Pristina. Viet Nam encouraged negotiated solutions to differences 
within the framework of the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) to ensure peace 
and security in the Balkans as a whole. 41 Viet Nam also participated on 14 October 
2009 in the Security Council open debate to address persistent challenges in 
achieving a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and promoted a 
peaceful settlement of Arab-Israel conflicts. Viet Nam encouraged all parties to fulfill 
their mutual obligations under the Road Map, the Madrid terms of reference, the 
Arab Peace Initiatives and relevant Security Council resolutions including 1701 
(2006), 1850 (2008), and 1860 (2009).42 
 
On 21 December 2009, Viet Nam participated as a permanent representative at the 
Security Council debate of the African Union (AU) panel on Darfur, which engaged in 
finding a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict. Viet Nam supported the AU’s central 
role in promoting the Darfur peace process in close coordination with the UN, the 
UN-AU Joint Chief Mediator, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in 
Darfur (UNAMID) and regional states so that conflict in Darfur and the sub-region 
could be resolved by a political solution achieved through peaceful negotiations. Viet 
Nam’s Delegation stressed that a balanced approach would be required to fight 
against impunity of violent crimes.43 
 
Before it membership on the Security Council also, Viet Nam hosted the UN 
Workshop in 2005 on Implementing Security Council Resolution 1540, which 
imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of 
delivery, including establishing appropriate controls over related materials. The 
Resolution also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts, in 
accord with and promoting universal adherence to existing international non 
proliferation treaties.44 Overall, Viet Nam’s involvement in the Security Council and 
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UN leadership roles have promoted multilateralism on the basis of respect for the 
fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.45 
 
As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Viet Nam has 
made great effort to contribute to the success of the Association in addressing the 
political security, economy and socio-culture of the region.46 Viet Nam has fostered 
effective partnerships promoting regional peace and security through cohesive and 
rule-based institutional frameworks through the ASEAN + 3 process, the East Asian 
Summit and the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF). ASEAN itself was granted observer 
status in the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 and the ASEAN Charter came 
into force in 2008. In terms of ASEAN’s relationship with the UN, ASEAN cooperated 
closely with the UN in response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008. The 
Association also signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation which 
provides an institutionalised framework for enhanced ASEAN-UN relations and 
cooperation while allowing ASEAN to make a greater contribution to the promotion 
of global peace and stability.47 In 2008, ASEAN established the Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. In 2009, ASEAN 
established the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to 
promote and protect human rights and regional cooperation on human rights. As 
recently as October 2010, Viet Nam hosted the 2010 ASEAN-United Nations 
Summit.48As an active member in ASEAN, Viet Nam has contributed to multilateral 
diplomacy that has improved the region’s capacity to protect its civilians as outlined 
in pillar two. 
 
Viet Nam also promotes peacekeeping and conflict prevention while adhering to the 
principles that respect territorial integrity, national sovereignty, non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other States, and the engagement in the peaceful settlement 
of disputes.49 Viet Nam’s participation in conflict prevention includes a continued 
effort to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and most 
significant to R2P, Viet Nam supports the restrictions of the importation, exportation 
and transfer of conventional arms. In accordance with international standards, the 
Vietnamese authorities have put in place an Action Program on preventing, 
combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW).50 
In the context of the R2P, the availability of firearms has played an important role in 
shaping the onset, duration and severity of violence. There is particular concern for 
the misuse of arms or police equipment by repressive regimes who are failing in 
their responsibility to prevent mass atrocity crimes or in situations where an ongoing 
conflict threatens to escalate into the commission of violations relating to the 
responsibility to protect.51 Viet Nam cooperates closely with other countries at the 
sub-regional, regional and international levels regarding illicit SALW trafficking to 
prevent violent conflict, to strengthen anti-terrorist activities, to contribute to the 
fight against trans-national crime and to maintain international security.52 
 
Viet Nam and Pillar Three 
Pillar three requires a wide range of collective action by the international community 
to fulfil the responsibility to protect populations. It includes the responsibility of the 
international community, through the United Nations, to use appropriate diplomatic, 
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humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of 
the Charter, to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.53 Viet Nam has expressed concerns regarding pillar three 
saying that the R2P could potentially be misused by some to claim legitimacy for 
unilateral coercive measures or intervention in the internal affairs of states. This 
point raises some fundamental questions about Viet Nam’s interpretation of its own 
unilateral intervention into Cambodia in late 1978. Viet Nam was harshly criticised 
for this intervention, despite the fact that it brought to an end the Khmer Rouge’s 
reign which had presided over the deaths of nearly two million people. While it is 
questionable that Viet Nam carried out its intervention into Cambodia on 
humanitarian grounds, it nevertheless has sought recognition for the humanitarian 
benefits of this action.54 With regard to the issue of future interventions on the basis 
of R2P, however, Viet Nam has expressed the fear about the potential bias of the 
Permanent Five Security Council Members and their use of their veto power for 
domestic sovereign purposes over the responsibility to protect civilians.55 When 
considering pillar three, Viet Nam has stressed the necessity to base timely and 
decisive responses to diverse circumstances. This is to include an equal emphasis and 
consideration of the voluntary engagement of States, the application of timely and 
decisive collective action, the ‘case by case basis’, the conformity with the UN 
Charter, including Chapter VII, and the cooperation with relevant regional 
organisations, as affirmed in paragraph 139 of the 2005 World summit Outcome.56 
Viet Nam sees a necessity for these five components to be equally considered so as 
to eliminate an opportunity of politicization, selectivity and double standards when 
intervention is to be enforced.57 Viet Nam has also emphasized the importance of 
ensuring non-selectivity of the Security Council and calls for the Permanent Five 
Security Council Members to refrain from employing their veto power in cases 
involving mass atrocities.58 
 
Overall, Viet Nam has endorsed its strongest support where the General Assembly 
could only progress on action to protect under the primary support for States to 
protect their own populations (pillar one), and the international community’s 
responsibility to assist States to build their capacity to protect their populations 
(pillar two). Only with the consideration of the principles, rules and doctrine guiding 
the application of coercive force, can Viet Nam accede to and see the R2P’s three-
pillar application of the responsibility to protect being most effective. Thus, these 
concerns notwithstanding, Viet Nam has committed to work proactively and 
constructively with other members of the international community to ensure the 
success of the responsibility to protect. 
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Section Two: Challenges Viet Nam Faces in Implementing R2P
 
 
The purpose of this section is to draw attention to the present challenges Viet Nam 
currently faces in its efforts to implement the R2P. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
has emphasized that the prevention and response to genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity should be ‘narrow but deep’.59 In this 
context, upholding the Responsibility to Protect should employ a wide array of 
prevention and protection mechanisms available to Member States, the United 
Nations system, regional and sub-regional organizations and their civil society 
partners that include measures aimed at preventing another case of genocide or 
mass atrocity crimes.60 Such measures involve, for example, a state upholding the 
rule of law to address impunity, promoting and protecting human rights, maintaining 
sustainable social and economic development assistance, good governance capacity-
building, strengthening legal protections and judicial systems, fighting corruption, 
and promoting civil society and strong civil institutions.61  
 
In relation to these mechanisms and measures, this section of the report will discuss 
the inefficiencies of Viet Nam’s legal standards and mechanisms and their 
subsequent contributions to collective violations of human rights and to the 
potential commission of mass atrocity crimes, which are crucial for the 
implementation of R2P. The Vietnamese government’s incapacity to address human 
rights violations is further exacerbated by the lack of political space for civilians to 
voice and address their needs and concerns. In order for Viet Nam’s to fulfill its 
obligation to protect its populations, it is essential that authorities create political 
solutions to peacefully address conditions contributing to discontent. It is also 
important that the Vietnamese government recognize the necessity of implementing 
appropriate legal standards to end the government’s impunity for human rights 
abuses and corruption. Until a comprehensive domestic system of mechanisms 
compatible with international human rights’ standards is incorporated in Viet Nam, 
the government’s demonstration of international cooperation can only be conceived 
as lip service and obstructive to the country’s capacity to protect its civilians from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
 
Current Concerns 
There are growing concerns regarding the government’s methods of retaliation to 
social discontent demonstrated by peaceful demonstrators and the continual culture 
of the Vietnamese authority’s impunity for human rights violations. These may 
escalate as the Vietnamese Communist Party struggles to balance a market economy 
with communist ideology and socialist values. As it stands, Viet Nam faces growing 
labour problems and militancy in respect of low minimum wages and poor working 
conditions.62 There is also growing disillusionment over Doi Moi with the 
entrenchment of a widening gap between the rich and poor.63 In the last decade, 
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struggles between reformers and conservatives within the VCP Politiburo’s Central 
Committee, the centre of political power in Viet Nam, have contributed to 
disharmony and internal party division which have, in turn, prompted speculations 
concerning the effectiveness of government.64 Pervasive corruption also tarnishes 
the Party’s legitimacy. With the end of the Cold War, Vietnamese authorities 
tightened control on society by arbitrarily arresting, imprisoning, detaining and 
restricting persons for their peaceful advocacy for democracy and their human 
rights.65 The people of Viet Nam are requesting social justice in a climate of intense 
political control combined with cultural and growing social fragmentation. In the 
context of R2P, concerns regarding Viet Nam’s government’s response of repression 
to demands for social justice are based on an understanding of the causes of 
genocide and mass atrocities. Specific preconditions of genocide and mass atrocities 
that have allowed conflicts to escalate into genocide and mass atrocities in the past 
are present today in Viet Nam.  
 
Historically, genocide and mass atrocities have predominantly been crimes of 
governments or their agents with the purpose of eliminating or suppressing a group; 
in the case of genocide, national, ethnic, racial or religious groups.66 The consensus 
behind R2P is that the deliberate and calculated political choice of governments to 
commit mass violence against civilians depends on the institutional framework of the 
state concerned and this framework’s capabilities to minimize the possibility to 
choose mass violence over cooperation.67 Therefore, if a government has 
institutionalized a domestic process of good governance so as to limit (or eliminate) 
its impunity for gross abuses of human rights, it is less likely to choose a path of 
violence as a means of addressing civil conflict, revolution or opposition. Good 
governance, in the context of R2P, would include the domestic implementation of 
mechanisms that promote the rule of law, a competent and independent judiciary, 
the protection of human rights, security sector reform, a robust civil society, and an 
independent press and political culture which favours tolerance, dialogue and 
mobility over the rigidities and injustices of identity politics.68 Good governance also 
includes the provision of plural space to avoid the dominance of exclusionary 
ideologies and centralized power that could provide the justification for arbitrary 
mass killing and human rights’ abuses.69 The function of such mechanisms is to 
maintain a representative balance and unbiased position to give legitimacy when 
monitoring and maintaining political stability, human rights and economic 
prosperity. Overall, balanced state-society relations provide a framework where 
good governance is enhanced. Furthermore, a state’s civil society can provide details 
of state failures in the function of mechanisms and representation. With this in mind, 
this section will examine Viet Nam’s performance of governance through its capacity 
to monitor the protection of its civilians, the representation of the people and civil 
society in Viet Nam and also how the VCP addresses challenges to its political 
legitimacy.  
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Monitoring the Protection of Civilians in Viet Nam 
 
Human Rights in Viet Nam 
As pointed out in Section One, Viet Nam has implemented many mechanisms and 
fundamental institutional changes while the Vietnamese Communist Party has 
gradually opened up to regional and international influences as part of a transitional 
process in line with Doi Moi. However, recorded human rights abuses call into 
question the actual function of these mechanisms. While Viet Nam’s 1992 
Constitution has allowed for the ‘rule of law’ to provide respect for human rights, the 
reality is that the government continues to use the rule of law selectively and 
restricts individual rights on the grounds of national security through provisions 
made in the 1999 Penal Code and 2003 Criminal Procedure.70 Provisions in the 1999 
Penal Code and 2003 Criminal Procedure are broadly interpreted by the Vietnamese 
authorities so as to protect the socialist regime and the interests of the State and 
often over-rule human rights provided for in the country’s Constitution. For example, 
there is no distinction made between acts of violence, such as terrorism and the 
peaceful acts of expression to allow freedom of expression or religion as outlined in 
the country’s Constitution in Articles 69.71 Where terrorism would compromise 
national security, the latter, peaceful acts of expression, question the monopoly of 
power of the Vietnamese Communist Party.72 However, the final sentence in Article 
70 of the Constitution states, “no one has the right to infringe on the freedom of 
faith and religion or take advantage of the latter to violate State laws and policies.”73 
In practice, some scholars have argued that the Vietnamese Communist Party rules 
rather than governs while controlling the entire structure of Vietnamese society in a 
Leninist-style polity of playing the ‘leading role’ through repression.74 Vietnamese 
authorities have demonstrated little tolerance of democratic discussion while 
imposing severe restrictions on human rights on the grounds of violating state law 
and policies. Violations of human rights are most predominantly committed by the 
authorities in regards to the rights to speech, opinion, religion, the press, as well as 
the right to assembly, forming associations, and holding demonstrations. In such 
situations, there is little protection against arbitrary action by government and 
political authorities. 
 
The current state of protections for human rights in Viet Nam requires improvement 
if the country is to uphold fully its responsibility to protect its civilians. To the 
detriment of human rights in Viet Nam, the country does not have a national human 
rights institution accredited by the International Coordinating Committee of National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC).75 The 
Vietnamese authorities have expressed their interest in building a comprehensive 
legal system to promote and guarantee human rights by pursuing a consistent policy 
of respecting and ensuring rights as enshrined in the country’s latest Constitution of 
1992.76  However, at many points in the last decade, these rights have been regularly 
and significantly violated. Contrary to UN protocol, the Vietnamese government has 
not extended or agreed upon a standing invitation to all thematic special procedures 
regarding the above rights since 1998 when a Special Rapporteur, in accordance with 
the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/18, was appointed to examine, 
monitor, advise and report on the civil and political rights and the question of 
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religious intolerance in Viet Nam.77 Since then, special requests made in 2006 
regarding summary executions, in 2008 regarding freedom of religion and the rights 
to food and water and sanitation have not been agreed upon by the Vietnamese 
authorities.78 Many violations concerning these rights have been committed towards 
people belonging to Viet Nam’s ethnic minority groups by the Vietnamese 
authorities. Recorded incidents made by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International relate to the commission of torture of religious leaders in Vietnamese 
prisons draws attention to a lack of sufficient mechanisms to address the impunity of 
human rights violations made by the Vietnamese authorities.79 In addition, the 
government has yet to become party to the Convention Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), making it difficult to 
monitor, through domestic cooperative UN mechanisms under the Optional 
Protocol, how Viet Nam treats prisoners in places of detention.80 Nor is Viet Nam 
party to the Rome Statute that governs the International Criminal Court that was 
established to persecute perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. The International Criminal court plays a crucial part of a 
collective responsibility to prevent such mass atrocities. Viet Nam’s accedence to the 
Rome Statute would therefore be a welcome improvement in its commitment to the 
prevention and punishment of such crimes.81 
 
The principle that States have a responsibility to protect all peoples residing in their 
territory, be they members of majorities or minorities, indigenous peoples, citizens 
or non-citizens lies at the heart of the commitment to the Responsibility to Protect 
made by all UN Member States at the 2005 World Summit.82 According to the UN 
independent expert on minority issues, minorities have been the principle victims of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing by fellow citizens or by the state as a result of 
identity-based tensions. Between 2007 and 2009 over fifty-five per cent of violent 
conflicts of significant intensity involved violations of minority rights or tensions 
between communities.83 While genocide and ethnic cleansing have all too clearly 
demonstrated the dangers of failing to protect minority groups as seen in Rwanda, 
Yugoslavia, and Darfur, the promotion and protection of the rights of minorities can 
undoubtedly contribute to political and social stability, conflict prevention and the 
prevention of mass atrocities. In his report to the General Assembly, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon underscored that it is evident that States that handle their 
internal diversity well, foster respect among disparate groups, and have effective 
mechanisms for handling domestic disputes and protecting the rights of women, 
youth and minorities, are unlikely to follow a destructive path of widespread and 
systemic violence.84  
 
Gay McDougall also stated recently at the 65th session of the General Assembly in 
2010 that attention to minority issues and minority rights violations at an early 
stage, before they lead to tensions and violence, would make an invaluable 
contribution to the culture of conflict prevention and the prevention of human 
rights’ abuses within the United Nations.85  In the context of R2P, the incorporation 
of minority rights’ indicators into early warning systems is essential to enable an 
early identification of potential commissions of mass atrocities towards or involving 
minority groups. Applying the R2P doctrine to the violations of minority rights 
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reinforces the primacy of the State’s responsibility to protect and promote the rights 
of minorities within its borders. As reaffirmed in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-
General on implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the emphasis of R2P is on the 
responsibility to prevent significant abuses so that intervention is not required.86 The 
strengthening, implementation and enforcement of human rights, and particularly 
the rights of ethnic minorities, so as to match international standards would better 
enhance and help fulfill Viet Nam’s responsibility to protect all persons within its 
borders. 
 
Viet Nam’s Policies for Ethnic Minorities and Indigenous Peoples  
The link between minority rights and conflict prevention has been addressed and 
developed under the auspices of the United Nations and regional organizations in 
resolutions of the General Assembly, the Commission of Human Rights, its successor 
the Human Rights Council, reports of the UN Secretary General and outcome 
documents of international conferences and policy processes. Viet Nam has become 
a supporter and participant to a range of multilateral treaties and declarations within 
these international regulatory frameworks that have set standards for minority 
protection and have improved the country’s capacity to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect all within its borders. For example, the Committee of the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination was established in 1966 and provides an early warning 
mechanism that draws attention to situations which have reached alarming levels of 
racial discrimination.87 The Vietnamese government became party to the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 
1982 and therefore can benefit from this mechanism.88 Also, the Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
was adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1992 to reaffirm respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedom for all, without distinction to race, 
language or religion.89 As a UN Member State, Viet Nam adopted this declaration. 
The Declaration has provided Viet Nam (and all UN Member States) a guide to set 
essential standards to manage diversity so as to ensure non-discrimination and the 
achievement of equality and participation for all minorities.90 Viet Nam also 
attended the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance, also known as the Durban Declaration of 2001. 
The Durban Declaration acknowledged that poverty, underdevelopment, 
marginalisation, social exclusion and economic disparities are closely associated with 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and contribute to 
continual racial attitudes and practices that generate more poverty and perpetual 
discrimination. The Vietnamese head of the delegation, H.E. Nguyen Phu Binh, 
confirmed the country’s commitment to the conference’s success and its continued 
conviction against racism, racial discrimination and the inequality of minorities.91 In 
2007, Viet Nam became a signatory of the new UN Universal Declaration on Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which sets out the individual and collective rights of native 
people to protect their lands and resources, and to maintain their unique cultures 
and traditions. It also promotes indigenous peoples’ full and effective participation in 
all matters that concern them.92 Viet Nam undoubtedly continues to acknowledge 
minority rights and has shown a greater commitment to understanding and 
implementing minority rights at local, national, regional and international levels. 
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In line with these commitments at an international level, in recent years, Viet Nam 
has made several positive advancements with respect to protecting the rights of its 
minorities and has also made concerted attempts to advance the socio-economic 
needs of minority groups. The UN Human Rights Council recognizes that Viet Nam’s 
ethnic minorities participate in an increasingly equal manner in the country’s socio-
political life.93 Viet Nam’s fifty-four ethnic groups, with unique religious, linguistic 
and cultural characteristics and identities, continue for the most part to live together 
in peace and share a tradition of patriotism and mutual assistance without ethnic 
conflict.94 While Viet Nam acknowledges its minority populations as an important 
constituent part of its nation, it is also aware of the challenges that it faces to ensure 
that the rights of minorities are respected, protected and promoted in all areas of 
life. The country’s constitution stipulates that the state applies the policy of equality, 
solidarity and mutual assistance among the various ethnic communities and forbids 
all acts of ethnic discrimination and division.95 The various ethnic communities have 
the right to use their own language and writing, to preserve their ethnic identity and 
to nurture their customs, traditions and cultures.96 The State also implements 
policies of all-round development aimed at gradually improving and raising the 
material and spiritual conditions of life of ethnic minorities.97 The rights belonging to 
Viet Nam’s ethnic minorities can be found in national basic legal documents such as 
in the Civil Code, the Labour Code, and the Law of Elections of Deputies to the 
National Assembly, the Law on Protection of Public Health and the Law on 
Education.98 Viet Nam has also established the Committee on Ethnic Minority and 
Mountainous Affairs (CEMMA) to meet its responsibilities on provincial and district 
levels so as to reduce the economic and social gaps between its minority 
communities and the majority population, known as the ‘Kinh’ ethnic group (ethnic 
Vietnamese).99   
 
Over the past thirteen years, Viet Nam has created numerous policies and programs 
targeted at socio-economic development and poverty reduction for minorities in an 
effort to implement social justice.100 The effects of some these policies on minority 
groups in Viet Nam are discussed further in the last section of this report. The most 
radical programme established to target the most vulnerable minority groups is 
Programme 135. Programme 135 for ‘Socio-Economic Development of Communes 
Facing Extreme Difficulties in Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas in Viet Nam’ 
was launched in 1998 and was budgeted until 2010 at a total project investment of 
US$1.74 billion.101 Its objective has been to accelerate production radically and 
promote market-oriented agricultural development.102 It has made a major 
contribution to poverty reduction in the country’s ethnic minority and mountainous 
areas, while addressing their geographical isolation, harsh environmental conditions 
and reduced economic capacity.103 The highland communities have benefitted 
through long-term improvements to infrastructure and income from employment as 
labourers on public projects.104  
 
Representation for ethnic minorities has also improved recently in Viet Nam. The 
country had its first national ethnic minority congress on 12 May 2010, at which 
1,702 delegates from ethnic minority groups throughout the country participated to 
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review and evaluate ethnic-minority affairs.105  Vietnamese authorities have also 
recently extended an invitation to UN independent expert on minority issues, Ms. 
Gay McDougall, to examine and assess the human rights situation of Viet Nam’s 
numerous minority groups in conformity with her UN mandate that compliments 
and enhances the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.106  
 
The existence of a culture of impunity for violations of human rights by the 
Vietnamese government has undermined efforts to build and entrench the rule of 
law in Viet Nam. The link between minority rights and conflict prevention draw 
attention to the vulnerabilities of minorities in an environment of arbitrary actions 
by governments and political authorities as demonstrated by the violations of 
specific rights in respect of discontent minorities in Viet Nam. This next part will 
examine specific situations of violations of human rights that warrant concern for 
the well being of Viet Nam’s ethnic minorities. 
 
Areas of Grave Concern 
While the Vietnamese government has demonstrated active efforts to address the 
needs and rights of its minorities, the Summary prepared by the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for Viet Nam’s most recent 
Universal Period Review in May 2009 reveals many concerns for the well-being of 
minority groups in Viet Nam. Several international human rights NGOs have also 
raised similar concerns. Amnesty International (AI), the Unrepresented Nations and 
Peoples Organization (UNPO), the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) 
and the Viet Nam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR) have noted that the 
indigenous Christian Montagnard Degar Peoples and the Khmer Kampuchea Krom 
Peoples in Viet Nam, have suffered decades of persecution in terms of confiscation 
of their ancestral lands, religious repression, torture, killings, unjust imprisonment, 
discrimination as well as violations of their civil and political rights.107 This 
contributes to further concern for upholding the responsibility to protect in Viet 
Nam as scholars from comparative genocide studies have determined that long-term 
violations of human rights based on ethnic minority or religious difference is a 
significant precondition of genocide and other mass atrocities.108  
 
The UN independent expert on minority issues, Ms Gay MacDougall, has raised 
concerns for the rights of minorities in Viet Nam after her recent visit to Viet Nam 
from 5-15 July 2010. Ms McDougall visited the provinces of Dier Bien in the Northern 
Highlands, Tra Vinh in the Mekong Delta region and Gia Lai and Kon Tum provinces in 
the Central Highlands, which are regions of significant minority populations in Viet 
Nam.109 Ms McDougall expressed concern regarding limitations placed on the rights 
of minorities to the freedom to practice their religions without restrictions, their 
freedom of association and expression and their right of peaceful assembly. Ms 
McDougall also raised concerns regarding the equal right of minorities in Viet Nam to 
own and use land and their right to participate fully and effectively in decision 
making regarding issues that affect them, including with respect to economic 
development projects and re-settlement issues.110  
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Minorities in Viet Nam: A History of Discrimination, Repression, Religious Persecution, 
Arbitrary Arrest and Torture 
The systematic demonstration of racial discrimination and repression of indigenous 
peoples by the VCP involves a complex history of the relationship between 
minorities and the state which has been influenced by the country’s long struggle 
against foreign domination and for national independence. After winning 
independence from the French in 1954, the Democratic Republic of (North) Viet Nam 
became preoccupied with enhancing national integration of its fifty-four officially 
recognised ethnic groups.111 Once the North was united with the South in 1976, the 
VCP concentrated on maintaining unity and mobilising support towards government 
policies that embodied Marxist-Leninist ideologies. Particular indigenous sects 
founded in the early 1900s, such as the Hoa Hoa and the Cao Dai, were associated 
with anti-colonial and later, anti-communist movements in Viet Nam and were seen 
by the VCP as a potential threat to security and the regime.112  Of Viet Nam’s 88.9 
million people113, ethnic minorities make up around 14 per cent of the total 
population, but inhabit approximately three-quarters of the country’s territory.114 
Therefore, the maintenance of minority loyalty to the State is seen as critically 
important to the country’s national unity and survival.  As stated in the Constitution 
of 1959, national minorities had a right to maintain their traditions, but only as long 
as they did not pose a threat to the socialist progress of the country’s relations. At 
present, as stated in Article 38 of the 1992 Constitution, the State forbids any person 
to use democratic freedoms to the detriment of the interest of the State and of the 
people.115 This limitation continues to be applied in relation to the provision for 
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association and religion.116 Today, ethnic 
minorities in Viet Nam are repressed and persecuted in their struggle for these 
freedoms.  This repression and persecution is aimed primarily at preventing religions 
and their clergy from becoming forces of dissent against the VCP.  The Degar 
Montagnards from the Central Highlands and the Khmer Kampechea Krom Peoples 
from the Mekong Delta have experienced decades of repression and persecution 
from the Communist regime in fear their beliefs could rapidly spread and thus create 
a major political challenge to the regime. 
 
Case Study: Degar Montagnards 
The contemporary marginalised position of the Degar Montagnards, an indigenous 
minority group in the Central Highlands, has its roots in the First Indochina War with 
the French and during the American involvement in tensions between the North and 
South during the 1960s and 1970s. The Vietnamese revolutionaries and the French 
colonists each attempted to dominate the highlands and enlisted highlanders on 
their respective sides with the promise of autonomy. During the Second Indochina 
War, the Vietcong National Liberation Front (NLF) and the United States and South 
Vietnamese governments also tried to persuade the highlanders to join their 
respective sides while using the central mountains and plains as battlegrounds 
between the opposing forces.117 Even today, separatist movements or the exhibition 
of divided loyalties through social unrest by the Montagnards (and other minority 
groups) have been perceived by the Vietnamese authorities as a serious threat to 
national unity and contrary to Communist ideals of socialist-polity intent on 
maintaining a submissive population.118  
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Within the last decade, the Montagnards have publically demonstrated on several 
occasions by making requests that the Vietnamese government allow them freedom 
of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, the right to be informed, and the right 
to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations within the provisions of the 
law, as provided for in Article 69 of the 1992 Constitution.119 Their protests are 
primarily against land confiscation and religious persecution and are an effort to 
preserve the lives and culture of the indigenous Montagnard peoples and to 
safeguard their innate and inalienable human rights.120 Their continual struggle in 
defending their human rights has prompted the Vietnamese authorities to retaliate 
with the arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trials and even murder of Montagnards 
who are party to opposition political parties, independent trade unions, 
unsanctioned media outlets and religious organisations.121 Many who have fled to 
Cambodia have been subject to refoulment and persecuted by Vietnamese 
authorities upon their return which is in violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention.122 
Viet Nam is not party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nor the 
1967 Protocol which underpin the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, 
non-penalization and non-refoulment of those fleeing from persecution.123 This 
continued persecution of the Montagnards by government forces is in direct 
violation of Viet Nam’s responsibility to protect all its peoples under pillar one 
obligations. 
 
The Montagnards are comprised of numerous Malayo-Polynesian, Mon-Khmer and 
Sino-Tibetan ethnic groups who have settled in the mountains of the Central 
Highlands of Viet Nam. The Central Highlands, called Tay Nguyen, are made up of 
mountains and wide plateaus bordering the Truong Son range that is rimmed on the 
west by the frontiers of Laos and Cambodia and on the east by coastal plains.124 They 
include the four southern central Vietnamese provinces of Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dac Lac 
and Lam Dong, and have a total population of approximately four million people, of 
whom about one million are Degar Montagnards.125 Of these, between 229,000 to 
400,000 are thought to follow evangelical Protestantism. An additional 150,000 to 
200,000 are Roman Catholic.126 
 
Living in the mountainous regions of the Central Highlands, the Montagnards are 
distinctly different from the ‘Kinh’ or mainstream ethnic Vietnamese who live on the 
plains and on the deltas.127 The Montagnards also differ linguistically and culturally 
from lowlanders, while each tribal group or subgroup has its own customs and 
system of beliefs, rites and myths. Most mountain villages are dominated by a single 
ethnic group.128 Examples of such ethnic groups include the tribes of Bahnar, Jarai, 
Rhadé, Koho, Sedang, Bru, Pacoh, Katu, Jeh, Cua, Halang, Hre, Rongao, Monom, 
Roglai, Cru, Mnong, Lat, Sre, Nop, Maa, and Stieng.129 Generally, all groups live by an 
agricultural self-subsistence system on small holdings that are in remote districts. 
Their semi-closed communities function through the integral role of each individual 
addressing the demands of the group’s environment and cosmic forces by means of 
cooperation and mutual help and support. The village is the most important 
economic and political unit in their lives as they produce and consume what they 
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need. Therefore, customs and moral codes are deeply internalised since all 
inhabitants share common needs, style of life, values and patterns of kinship.130  
 
All aspect of life for the hill tribes are influenced by religious beliefs and rituals. The 
traditional religion for Montagnards was predominantly animism of which spirits and 
their powers over humans were present and active in the natural world. Sacrificial 
offerings, religious ceremonies, ancestral worship, taboos and agricultural beliefs 
and rites are common in relation to events such as illness, marriage, birth, funerals 
and natural disasters.131 Christianity was introduced to the Montagnards in Vietnam 
in the 1850s by French Catholic missionaries. Some Montagnards embraced 
Catholicism, incorporating aspects of animism into their system of worship. By the 
1930s, American Protestant missionaries had become active in the Highlands and 
mission schools and churches became important social institutions in the Highlands. 
The church encouraged the Montagnards to seek political autonomy separate from 
the Vietnamese regime. Historically, therefore, the oppression of the church in the 
Highlands by the Vietnamese regime is rooted in this dynamic.132 The VCP has 
outlawed what it calls “Dega Christianity” as they see the highland minorities as 
promoting separatism through their demonstrations over grievances regarding poor 
economic conditions and removal from their ancestral land.133 
 
These tensions between the central Vietnamese government and the peoples of the 
highlands have deep historical roots. The French, who colonised Viet Nam from 
1895-1954, politically stimulated ethnic fragmentation and independence 
movements when they recognized hill tribe rights over the land they occupied.134 
The French called the indigenous hill tribes peoples of the Central Highlands, 
“Montagnards”, which means “people of the mountains”.135 French policies 
generally supported the maintenance of hill tribe culture and the political autonomy 
of the Montangards. The French named the Central Highlands the “Pays 
Montagnards du Sud Indochinois” or the Montagnard country of South Indochina.136 
They also created the Federal Government Commissariat for the Montagnard People 
of South Indochina in May, 1946 under the authority of Bai Dai, the king of Viet Nam, 
who created a special statute guaranteeing the Montagnards political independence. 
To the present time, the Montagnards claim to be the first people to inhabit the 
Central Highlands of Viet Nam and are therefore the rightful owners of its land.137 
Their claim is based on their ancestors having been in possession of the Central 
Highlands for more than two thousand years and the French recognition of their 
rights to this land when formalising borders in 1946. Prior to French colonisation, the 
highland areas remained virtually independent, as long as group leaders recognised 
the Vietnamese sovereignty and paid tribute and taxes.138  
 
The French also adopted administrative policies that distinguished between the 
lowland Vietnamese and the highlanders.139 The customary laws of the various 
highland peoples were recognised and codified by the French in an effort to protect 
their cultural uniqueness.140 Failure to integrate the highland peoples into the 
lowland-based administrative system or to achieve mutually acceptable relations 
between the Vietnamese elite and the highlanders inhibited Vietnamese efforts to 
resist and defeat the French colonisation of Viet Nam.141 The French exploited the 
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poor relations by encouraging the highlanders to see France’s conquest of Viet Nam 
as their liberation from Vietnamese domination of their land. Furthermore, the 
French mobilised the highlanders to help defeat Vietnamese resistance from 1885 
until the early 1900s with their extensive knowledge of the highland terrain and their 
capabilities to adapt to the environment.142 Many Montagnards were also allied with 
the United States during the Viet Nam War. American Special Forces penetrated 
highland villages and armed and trained highlanders for anti-NLF activities in the 
Central Highlands.143  Thus the memory of the highlanders’ involvement against the 
Vietnamese authorities over the past century has contributed to distrust by the VCP 
to present associations with highlanders.144  
 
With Viet Nam’s independence from France in 1955, Viet Nam established its first 
Constitution in 1959 which promised minorities that their languages and cultures 
would be protected and that their peoples would not suffer discrimination in the 
new state.145 However, the republic’s territory was declared “one and indivisible” 
and a vague policy of “autonomy” was favoured over the right to highlander self-
determination.146 All land now belonged to the State under Vietnamese Law. This 
was affirmed in the 1959 Constitution which differed from the 1946 Constitution  
with regards to property ownership. In the 1946 Constitution, there was a guarantee 
to individual ownership of property, while in the 1959 Constitution implemented an 
inflexible hierarchy of property ownership, which restricted private property, and 
consolidated state ownership and collective ownership of property to enable a 
central role of the state to lead all economic activities.147  After 1976 and with the 
implementation of socialism, large areas of land in the Central Highlands came under 
control of state farms and state enterprises that were largely staffed by Kinh 
migrants.148  
 
The policy of the central government was to integrate the highland minorities with 
the mainstream Kinh by moving lowland over-crowded delta farmers to the less 
populated highlands. First, this resettlement, under the New Economic Zones (NEZ) 
program, would help the highland minorities develop and ‘civilise’ them as well as 
reducing the density of population in the lowland area. Second, it increased food 
production on unused lands and also reduced land degradation from the swidden 
farming techniques used by the ethnic minorities on the highland slopes.149 Between 
1976 when the first NEZs were established, and the early 1990s approximately six 
million people were resettled in Viet Nam. The population of the Central Highlands 
increased from 420,000 in 1926 to over 2.8 million by 1991, and then to over 4 
million in 2002.150 The Central Highlands were the main areas where the government 
encouraged migration. However, land disparities between the ethnic minorities and 
mainstream Kinh in the Central Highlands centred on the hardships minorities faced 
by uneven land distribution of which indigenous inhabitants were given an average 
area of 0.25 hectares per household and mainstream Kinh were given and average 
land area of 1 to 2 hectares  per household.151 To this day, the Montagnards 
continue to be denied recognition of their traditional minority claims to land rights, 
are denied education, financial resources, representation and the opportunity to 
maintain their culture. 
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Partly as a result of these repressive measures, around 2,000 members of the 
Christian Montagnard community fled to Cambodia in 2001 and 2004 after 
Vietnamese security forces crushed protests against land confiscations and religious 
persecution.152 The 2004 crackdown resulted in numerous killings of Montagnards in 
the Central Highlands, which have never been adequately investigated.153 There are 
continuing reports of violence, arbitrary arrests and torture experienced by some 
Christian Montagnards despite the 2002 and 2009 Concluding Observations of the 
UN Human Rights Council which regarded the Montagnards as facing “serious 
violations”.154 Furthermore, in August 2010, the UN Special Procedures mandate 
holders appealed to the Government of Viet Nam to ensure the rights to freedom of 
religion or belief in accordance with the principles set forth in the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination on Human Rights as 
well as of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights after Vietnamese 
soldiers, riot police, security forces and local police reportedly surrounded, attacked 
and threatened Degar Christians in thirty-two villages in Gia Lai Province of the 
Central Highlands.155  
 
To conclude this case study discussion, the Degar Montagnards of the Central 
Highlands have been subject to a long history of suspicion and repression by the 
Vietnamese government as a result of their disloyalty to Vietnamese Revolutionaries 
during the First Indochina War and their association with the American Special forces 
during the Second Indochina War. The Montagnards’ discontent and disloyalty to 
Vietnamese forces was and continues to be centred on their desire for autonomy 
and the right to maintain their ancestral lands, culture and religious practices. This is 
understood by Vietnamese authorities to be contrary to nationalistic sentiment and 
socialist values. As a result, the Vietnamese authorities response to the 
Montagnards’ demonstration of discontent with a heavy hand that suppresses 
specific human rights, such as freedom of religion, assembly and freedom of 
expression. The imprisonment, torture and physical abuse of Montagnards as 
members of a minority groups can be interpreted as a direct link between impunity 
and collective atrocities. Therefore, this report draws attention to the immediate 
necessity for the provision of the implementation of measures to eliminate the 
Montagnards’ vulnerabilities to violations of human rights that could potentially lead 
to the commission of mass atrocities. As such, the continued persecution of the 
Montagnards should be monitored as a potential R2P situation. There is also concern 
for the Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples in the Mekong Delta. Their situation is in 
many ways similar to that of the Montagnards. 
 
Case Study: The Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples 
The Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples who have lived for centuries in the Mekong 
Delta and lower Mekong have also faced systemic and severe human rights 
violations. In the same vein as the Montagnards, violations against the Khmer Krom 
include the confiscation of their ancestral lands, discrimination, and religious 
persecution by the Vietnamese authorities.156  
 
The Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples are indigenous ethnic Khmer minorities in the 
southern-most part of Viet Nam, just south of the southern Cambodian border. This 
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area was formerly part of the Khmer Empire from the 9th to 13th centuries. With the 
decline of the Khmer Empire, ethnic Kinh, or Viet people, settled into what is now 
this southern part of Viet Nam. During French colonial rule, the Mekong Delta region 
was incorporated into the French protectorate of Cochinchina. In 1949, the French 
divided and transferred this area to colonial Viet Nam. The Khmer Krom population 
that remain in this region live in the provinces of Soc Trang, Tra Vinh, Kien Giang, An 
Giang, Bac lieu, Can Tho, Vinh Long and Ca Mau.157 They continue to share the same 
religion (Theravada Buddhism), national language, culture, customs and traditions as 
the Khmer in Cambodia.158  
 
The Khmer Krom Peoples have experienced discrimination by the Vietnamese 
Communist Party since they took power of the country in 1976 when Vietnamese 
authorities began targeting Khmer Krom Buddhist temples and persecuting Buddhist 
monks who peacefully have stood up for their rights. In the decades since, the 
Khmer Krom in Viet Nam have had their ancestral farmlands confiscated and have 
been left homeless with no access to the fertile land of the Mekong Delta which 
provided plentiful food and water. Since 1976, many thousands Khmer Krom have 
been imprisoned and have faced brutal torture as a result of requesting the return of 
their ancestral land, recognition of their indigenous status, their inclusion in 
decision-making processes and their right to religious freedom.159 In 2007, after 
decades of discontent among ethnic Khmer Buddhists over government restrictions 
on religious freedom and inadequate Khmer language education, more than 200 
Buddhist monks protested on the streets in Soc Trang provincial town. The 
government response was harsh in efforts to stifle dissent with the murder of Khmer 
Krom monk Eang Sok Thoeun and at least twenty monks being defrocked and 
expelled from their pagodas.160 Traditionally dismissal from the monkhood is made 
by the sangha, or Buddhist community of monks, and not by the government, 
therefore making this a serious breach of the Buddhist code and an infringement on 
the right to practice religion and religious belief.161 Today, many Khmer Krom 
Peoples remain in prison or under house arrest, and like the Montagnards, the 
Khmer Krom Peoples are economically discriminated from the mainstream Kinh of 
Viet Nam.162 
 
Redressing Repression and Economic Disparity for Minorities 
According to the UN Global Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Report in 2008, it 
is important that Viet Nam continues to achieve the MDGs in all areas of the country 
so as to include every province, every commune and every ward. The Report 
expressed concern for the people living in remote and mountainous areas, 
particularly ethnic minorities, who now make up a growing proportion of the 
population living in poverty, and where child malnutrition remains widespread and 
almost one in three children is currently malnourished.163 These concerns draw 
attention to particular human rights issues that require the development of 
appropriate organisations and mechanisms which would contribute to the 
safeguarding of sustained benefit for all the country’s population.164  
 
The tension between maintaining indigenous practices and managing cultural 
diversity within Viet Nam needs to be addressed in a way that protects human rights. 
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The Montagnard Peoples and the Khmer Krom Peoples would like the Vietnamese 
authorities to respect their rights as indigenous people as well as to preserve their 
language, culture, and religion. However, Article 30 in the Viet Nam’s 1992 
Constitution states that the State assumes the unified administration of cultural 
development. Reactionary and depraved ideologies and culture are to be banned; 
superstition is to be driven out.165 In respect to indigenous ethnic minorities, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party has emphasized solidarity with the State over 
solidarity with one’s tribe or clansmen in fear that these ties would supersede ties to 
true socialism.166 Vietnamese law requires that religious groups register with the 
government and those that do not join one of the officially authorized religious 
organisations are considered as acting illegally on the basis of sowing divisions and 
harming national unity.167 According to Human Rights Watch as of January 2011, 300 
Montagnard Christians as well as Hoa Hao Buddhists and members of the Cao Dai 
religion are religious prisoners detained in harsh conditions. There is also compelling 
evidence of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners.168 Furthermore, there has been 
little outlet for dissatisfaction for ethnic minorities in Viet Nam while the 
government prohibits independent or privately-owned domestic media to operate 
and imposes strict controls over the press, internet and publications that 
disseminate materials that oppose the government, or promote reactionary ideas.169 
While the Vietnamese authority’s default position has been repression in response 
to ethnic dissent, there is limited space for the ethnic minorities to participate in 
addressing their concerns or issues. 
 
Representation of the People and Civil Society in Viet Nam  
While the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has permitted a growing mid-level 
private sector and has undertaken fundamental institutional changes to improve its 
economy, it continues to hold a firm grip on power and has rejected domestic and 
international requests for political reform and pluralism.170 Political reform and 
pluralism are required to address the social and cultural impact of Viet Nam’s 
growing economy and development, such as the increasing polarization between 
rich and poor and social inequality experienced in the mountainous areas.171 In 
response to discontent concerning these issues, the VCP continues to clamp down 
on oppositional civil society actors in an attempt to retain its monopoly on power. 
Such action demonstrates that Viet Nam’s political and social system has not 
experienced a similar renovation to its economic liberalization through Doi Moi 
reforms.172 As stated by the Security-General in his Report, ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’, responsible sovereignty is based on the politics of 
inclusion, not exclusion and therefore entails the building of institutions, capabilities 
and practices for the constructive management of the tensions so often associated 
with the uneven growth of rapidly changing circumstances that appear to benefit 
some groups more than others.173 While political reforms offer much promise for 
improved government-civil society relations, in order to fulfill its R2P obligations 
under pillar one, Viet Nam must improve the implementation of these reforms. 
 
The Vietnamese Communist Party has sought to limit the public sphere in Viet Nam 
since the early 1950s by imposing a proletarian dictatorship as a goal of socialism.174 
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Today, Viet Nam remains a one-party state that is ruled and controlled by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party. Although Viet Nam’s one-party state has been in a 
process of transition to a “soft authoritarian” state since the implementation of Doi 
Moi, the State’s policies are established and continue to be enforced by the One-
Party State which has extensive control over the executive, legislative and judiciary 
powers.175 Changes to government can only come from within the Party and changes 
to state policies can only be made by the party officials in the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Viet Nam.176 The country’s citizens 
cannot change their form of government and the behavior of its people is monitored 
by the Ministry of Public Security. Freedom of speech, press, assembly and 
association are restricted so as to limit independent political, legal, labour and social 
organizations as their formation is seen as an infringement upon and contrary to the 
interests of the state.177 Article 4 of Viet Nam’s Constitution states that the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, with adherence to Marxism-Leninism, is the force 
assuming leadership of the State and society.178 This excludes all forms of pluralism 
or alternative thought outside the Vietnamese Communist Party and restricts the 
action of civilians and their rights based on their compliance with the State’s 
interests and policies, “in accordance with the law”.179 Therefore, the population 
cannot go against the wishes of the State and there are very limited alternative 
avenues to address their issues. A balanced society-state relationship and 
representation of the people does not exist to provide accountability and 
transparency for government or to address the issues expressed by the Vietnamese 
population.  
 
Civil society in Viet Nam, as a realm separate from the state to serve common 
interests for the common good, is limited in its capacity to function as autonomous 
from the state. Under the VCP’s authoritarian rule, autonomous organizations are 
prohibited and there is no legal framework conducive to the emergence of civil 
society. All associations require approval by the government and are monitored and 
guided by the State in accordance with Decree 88 of the Civil Code.180 As an 
alternative to state independent organisations, the VCP developed a network of 
organizations in 1950 under Party rule so as to reach every sector and level of 
society under the umbrella organization of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF). 
The Party’s intension was to play an interventionist role in all aspects and levels of 
society in order to promote national solidarity and to persuade support for Party 
lines and policies.181 More recently, the Party has tolerated organizations that 
operate outside the existing legal framework, but these are limited to economic and 
socio-economic affairs and do not demonstrate political opposition or challenge the 
socialist ideology or undermine the Party.182 As a result, civil society continues to be 
actively suppressed by legal and coercive means and is largely an extension of the 
state, leaving a lack of a ‘real’ civil society that can adequately provide an 
independent, un-biased interpretation of civilian needs and government activities.  
 
With respect to the promotion of R2P, therefore, there is no clear institutional, legal 
or conceptual space for contestation in state-society relations nor is there a 
comprehensive facility to call the VCP to account for its actions or inaction on 
pressing issues such as human rights violations. This leaves little space for a 
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mechanism outside the government that can facilitate information flow and draw 
attention to paths of escalating violence and preconditions to mass atrocities.183 
Anyone who opposes the Party is therefore vulnerable to violations of human rights 
and the commission of mass atrocity crimes, such as ethnic minorities (Montagnards 
and Khmer Krom) who are continually discriminated against by the Vietnamese 
government. All civilians are further vulnerable to violence if there were to be a 
violent reaction by the government to revolutionary activity which questions the 
political legitimacy of the Vietnamese authorities.  
 
Maintaining Political Legitimacy 
In the past, the political legitimacy of the VCP (and the Democratic Republic of Viet 
Nam) was based on patriotism and nationalism that mobilized the population to 
resist foreign aggression and intervention.184 Since the implementation of Doi Moi in 
1986, and even more so since the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union in 1989-
91, the political legitimacy of Viet Nam’s one-party state has faced continual 
challenges by some party officials, intellectuals and pro-democracy activists. Leaders 
of the VCP and State find themselves negotiating between retaining their ideological 
integrity and addressing changes taking place as a result of economic progress. 
Dissidents have argued that economic liberalism alongside socialism is incompatible 
and that it has created a system that tolerates corruption and abuse of power from 
within the Party which can only be rectified by reforms inclusive of political 
pluralism.185 When challenged, the Vietnamese authorities have demonstrated an 
adaptable position with a response of economic and ministerial reform, but in many 
situations, repression remains the default position in response to political dissent, 
demonstrating the Party’s strong desire to retain power and repel a transition to 
democracy. It is simplistic and not the intention of this report to conclude that the 
process of globalization and economic liberalization will or should automatically lead 
to political liberalization and democratization in Vietnam. However, the report’s 
purpose has been to draw attention to the reality of government rhetoric towards 
addressing human rights and the Vietnamese government’s impunity to human 
rights abuses. Furthermore, while the Vietnamese people have been oppressed, 
their power to hold the VCP accountable has been very limited. The disclosure of 
patterns of authoritarian political thinking and heavy-handed rule leads to the 
understanding that the Vietnamese government is overriding the objectives of the 
country’s population. 
 
 Concerns have also been raised regarding the authority’s capabilities for solving 
conflict without resorting to authoritarian or even violent means in cases of 
demonstration, dissatisfaction or dissent. The VCP’s centralization of power and 
devotion to single handed rule while using forms of political and social exclusion that 
lack of socio-cultural recognition, call into question the principles of equality and 
justice in their commitment to socialism. They also provide a justificatory logic for 
mass killing as part of pre-conditions and causes of mass atrocity crimes. The wide 
range of long-term social, economic and political challenges faced by Viet Nam’s 
ethnic minorities (Montagnards and Khmer Krom) and followers of Theravada 
Buddhism, as demonstrated earlier in this section, are pre-conditions whereby 
human rights violations can escalate into more wide-spread and systematic 
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atrocities. Although incidents of mass atrocities have varied according to culture and 
location, past episodes of these types of crimes have demonstrated specific patterns 
leading to the commission of collective violence. Barbara Harff, a leading expert on 
mass violence, has provided a framework for assessing and comparing the 
vulnerabilities of countries to genocide and politicide (political mass murders), which 
she argues can identify countries in which the conditions for future episodes are 
present: an early warning system to detect humanitarian disasters in the making.186 
She concludes that states ruled by autocratic regimes are more likely to experience 
mass atrocities. Within this type of government formation, five types of genocidal 
tendencies have been identified187: 
 
1. State repression: mass atrocities are committed to maintain power 
and usually in the context of relatively weak states. 
2. Counter-insurgency: the commission of mass atrocities to defeat an 
insurgent organization (or group of people) by denying it access to a 
civilian population to hide amongst. 
3. Radical social transformation: the commission of mass atrocities to 
create a radical social transformation by eliminating a particular 
ethnic, religious, political or socio-economic group. 
4. Rebellion: the commission of mass atrocities as a strategy of rebellion 
against the state. 
5. Major War: the commission of mass atrocities as part of a strategy for 
winning a major war at the lowest cost. 
Most incidents of mass atrocities in the last century were perpetrated as a result of 
social division, regime and economic weaknesses that are a result of ideological 
commitments of ruling elites and democratic institutional constraints, characteristics 
of which are experienced in Viet Nam today.188 With regard to groups who have 
experienced persecution in these past cases, mass atrocities have also targeted 
victims that have been repressed due to their ideological, religious or ethnic 
associations. The goal of mass violence in such circumstances is often to eliminate or 
suppress a group because they are seen as hostile to the political ideology and goals 
of the state or particular elite.189 Therefore, the ethno-historical trajectory and 
religious affiliations of the Montagnards and Khmer Krom peoples render them at 
risk for the commission of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities when 
social divisions and political tensions become causal agents for the intensification of 
violence towards these ethnic minority groups.  
 
The on-set of past mass atrocities tend to take place in three stages, the first being 
pre-conditions, the second, a movement or upheaval and mobilization, and then the 
third, the elevation to imminent emergency.190 It is in the interest of the R2P to 
prevent all of these stages from occurring or escalating. In the case of protection for 
ethnic minority groups in Viet Nam, it is urgent to advocate preventive measures to 
address the present pre-conditions such as social division and economic weaknesses 
alongside the present commissions of human rights abuses towards ethnic 
minorities.  
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The Vietnamese Communist Party has also historically shown little tolerance for civil 
society as an independent mode of social action and interaction. However, in the last 
decade, a growing and more broad-based Vietnamese democratic movement has 
risen as a result of networking via the internet. In particular, the emergence of a 
middle-class youth demographic which is eager to integrate with the capitalist world, 
enjoy entertainment and recreation and achieve individual professional, financial 
and family successes challenges the VCP’s ideological commitments.191 A lack of 
response by the Vietnamese youth to the Party’s agenda of building socialism is 
broadening the gap in the relationship between the state and society.192 
Furthermore, the Internet has provided the opening of political space within the 
existing system where there is greater potential for overseas Vietnamese to engage 
trans-nationally in domestic political discourse.193 The nature of this emerging civil 
society in Viet Nam has revolved around the promotion of democracy, human rights, 
labour rights, ethnic minority rights and religious freedom. Among the trans-national 
political organizations which have been created as a result are the People’s 
democratic Party of Vietnam; the Vietnam Populist Party; the Democratic Party of 
Vietnam; the Committee for Human Rights in Vietnam; the Free Journalists 
Association of Vietnam; Bloc 8406; the Vietnam Progression Party; the Vietnam 
Alliance for Democracy and Human Rights; the Independent Labour Union of 
Vietnam; the United Workers-Farmers Association and the Lac Hong Group.194 
Although considered illegal and having no standing in the country’s one-party 
political system, these groups have provided financial and political support in a 
campaign for law, freedom and human rights.195  
 
How Viet Nam addresses the challenges posed by this new civil society movement 
will be determined by its success in creating a law-governed state. The State’s 
responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities depends on the creation 
of a law-governed state with guaranteed constitutional provisions that provide 
human rights to all and particularly, at this stage, the freedoms laid out in Article 69 
and Article 70 of its Constitution, “freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the 
right of assembly, association and demonstration and freedom of belief and 
religion”.196 In many ways, how the VCP reacts to these movements will also 
determine its political legitimacy. Recognizing Viet Nam’s culture of impunity for 
human rights violations and the understanding of mass violence as a product of 
governments that lack the institutional capacity to stop violence against civilians 
undermines Viet Nam’s commitment to and ability to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect. Under the Responsibility to Protect, this would warrant the potential 
involvement of regional and international intervention if violence were to escalate. 
By fulfilling fundamental protection obligations and respecting core human rights, 
the Vietnamese authorities would avoid unwelcomed intervention from outside 
their State. 
 
In his report to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized 
that the responsibility to protect is a moral imperative for UN institutional capacity-
building that, in turn, can only strengthen sovereignty. “By *helping+ States to meet 
their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to 
strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it.”197 Therefore, understanding mass violence 
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as a product of individual opportunists and institutional incapacities places the 
primary responsibility to protect Vietnamese civilians on the Vietnamese 
government itself, as stipulated in pillar-one of the R2P doctrine.  Effective 
mechanisms for addressing human rights and capacity-building to prevent conflict 
and escalating violence would prove far more effective to protect the country’s 
civilians and maintain the legitimacy of the government than using ideology as a 
cover for various forms of abuses to maintain power. As a preventative measure to 
fulfill the responsibility to protect, addressing the root causes of cultural tensions 
between the State and ethnic minorities must be a priority as the country’s ethnic 
minorities are the most vulnerable to violations of human rights and the potential to 
mass atrocities. Living up to the commitment of the Responsibility to Protect will 
also ensure the maintenance of peace, security and stability. Through a system of 
law that is responsive to the needs of the country’s population that includes justice 
and the Vietnamese peoples’ general welfare, the VCP would deter rebellion that 
could significantly undermine the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness in the 
eyes of its people and the international community. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations
 
 
Conclusion  
This report has argued that Viet Nam has a long history of colonial and post-colonial 
violence, civil war and social upheaval, thus making the prevention of future mass 
atrocities crucial. Viet Nam has stated its commitment to upholding its responsibility 
to protect its population from future mass atrocities and has also agreed to engage 
with the international community for assistance and to provide assistance in building 
protection capacities to exercise the R2P doctrine. This report has assessed the 
challenges Viet Nam faces in fulfilling these obligations. It has outlined that there 
exists a real opportunity to prevent mass atrocity crimes if Viet Nam were to 
strengthen its commitments to the R2P and if the government were to implement a 
coordinated and comprehensive strategy to address ongoing human rights violations 
in accordance with Standards outlined by the UN OHCHR. This entails the need for 
the Vietnamese government to apply a more comprehensive focus on legitimate 
equity and social justice concerns as well as strengthening the rule of law and socio-
economic development to provide stability and the maintenance of human rights for 
all its population. 
 
To conclude, the research conducted as part of this project has produced the 
following overall and specific recommendations for the future protection of Viet 
Nam’s population from the commission of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and other mass atrocities. 
 
Recommendations  
Strengthen commitment to preventing mass atrocities. Viet Nam’s role in the 
prevention of mass atrocities involves supporting the UN measures outlined in the 
R2P mandate provided in the UN Secretary General’s Report, ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’. Viet Nam should further engage in the three-pillar strategy 
by seeking regional and international assistance to gain comprehensive consensus 
and effective mechanisms that can be implemented in the country’s domestic law 
and institutions. Such mechanisms would support the prevention of pre-conditions 
to mounting violence and the commission of mass atrocities.  
 
Strengthen internal capacity and expand networks regarding upholding human 
rights. Respect for human rights is an essential element of mass atrocity prevention. 
Human rights are anchored in well-established international laws that lay down 
obligations of Governments to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of individuals and groups. Viet Nam should support the UN’s human rights 
mechanisms that guarantee human rights by law through treaties, declarations, 
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commissions and protocols. It is therefore recommended that the Vietnamese 
government accede to and consider ratifying: 
 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and implement it in 
national law  
 the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal 
Court and implement it in national law 
 the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons  from Enforced 
Disappearance 
 the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Status of Stateless 
Peoples 
 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
 The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime and its 
Protocols to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially 
women and children 
 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of  All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
 
Guarantee the maintenance of human rights. It is essential to the maintenance of 
human rights that the Vietnamese government allows groups to carry out human 
rights monitoring activities in Viet Nam, independently and without hindrance or 
threats. Therefore the Vietnamese Government is encouraged to permit and 
cooperate with international and domestic non-governmental organisations whose 
functions are to monitor and provide assistance for the maintenance of human rights 
to standards stipulated by the UNHCHR. In particular, the Vietnamese authorities are 
urged to re-engage with the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion. 
 
Cooperate with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) 
and ASEAN community extensions offices for community level human rights 
education and capacity-building. The Vietnamese authorities are advised to invite 
resource speakers from the members of the Southeast Asia National Human Rights 
Institutions forum (SEANF) and engage in their networking activities with other 
relevant institutions to engage in human rights education. Appropriate education 
and training of human rights promotion and maintenance should be provided for the 
benefit of all relevant Government authorities so the capacity of officials can ensure 
the effective implementation of human rights-related law. 
 
Implement a national human rights institution (NHRI). Viet Nam is also highly 
encouraged to implement a national human rights institution to advance the vital 
mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) in 
compliance with the Paris Principles.198 Therefore, the core international standards 
can be faithfully embodied in Viet Nam’s national legislation and the specified crimes 
and violations and their incitement can be criminalised under domestic law and 
practice.  
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Allow independent civil society stakeholders. At present, Viet Nam does not have a 
legal framework conducive to the emergence of an active and independent civil 
society. The government of Viet Nam is encouraged to allow a domestic civil society 
not bound by restrictions. Authorities should allow the population to engage the 
state, each other, the market and provide an independent political space to address 
issues of concern to the population through dialogue, advocacy and contention. 
Therefore, this must include ensuring the population  the freedom of the press and 
internet and freedom of assembly. 
 
Engage in dialogue with international experts on legal developments. The 
Vietnamese authorities are urged to review the country’s 1999 Penal Code and the 
2003 Criminal Procedure code to allow less scope for open interpretation and to 
provide consistent adherence to international norms outlined in the international 
human rights treaty commitments. Authorities are encouraged to take action to 
strengthen the legal basis for the accountability of all state authorities and the 
improvement of judicial scrutiny over their activities. This will aid in the 
establishment of an effective, open and transparent legal system based on the rule 
of law. 
Strengthen the focus on minority rights. The attention to minority issues and 
minority rights violations at an early stage is known to be an invaluable contribution 
to the prevention of mass atrocities. The Vietnamese authorities are therefore 
encouraged to take a more proactive approach to minority rights by putting 
protections in place long before tensions erupt. A proactive approach should involve 
expanding avenues to raise minority issues, such as: 
 Allowing minorities to participate in decision-making and allow 
representation of minorities at all levels of civic service 
 Continually reassessing the success of efforts to accommodate diversity and 
implementation of principles of non-discrimination 
 Providing the protection and preservation of culturally distinctive identities, 
including language and religious identities 
 Allowing minority groups to participate equally in and benefit from the 
economic life of the State  
 Acknowledging the indigenous status of the Christian Montagnards and the 
Khmer Kampuchea Krom Peoples. 
 Promoting solidarity between Kinh and minorities  
 
Address the systemic violations of human rights of particular minorities. It is essential 
for the prevention of mass atrocities to continually uphold human rights. Therefore, 
it is highly recommended that the Vietnamese government stop the repression of 
ethnic minority Christian Montagnards in the northern and central Highlands and to 
stop the repression of ethnic Khmer Krom Kampuchea Peoples and Khmer Buddhists 
in the Mekong Delta. Urgent steps must be taken to ensure that citizens can fully 
enjoy the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. This should 
include an amendment to the provisions in the Ordinance on religion and other 
domestic laws that criminalize certain religious activities on the basis of threats to 
national security. This should also permit independent religious organizations to 
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conduct peaceful religious activities in accordance with international legal standards 
and allow religious groups and organizations to obtain legal status and operate 
independently from other religious organizations if they desire independence. The 
torture and ill-treatment of political and religious prisoners should be condemned 
and the perpetrators of these crimes brought to trial. 
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